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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-INTERPRETING 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(2): 
WHAT ARE THE "CRITERIA" OF THE BLACK LUNG AMENDMENT OF 
19771 
The enactment of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 
of 19691 was a relatively recent step in providing benefits for miners 
stricken by pneumoconiosis. More commonly known as black lung 
disease because of its X-ray image? the affliction causes interference 
with the body's ability to transfer oxygen from the lungs to the blood 
stream.3 The sufferer may experience shortness of breath, coughing, 
wheezing, and, in severe cases, death.4 The magnitude of the disease is 
reflected in the fact that nationwide, miners have filed nearly one mil­
lion disability benefits claims since the initiation of the federal 
program.s 
While physicians recognized black lung as early as 1661,6 the 
causal link between coal mining and the disease was not discovered 
until nearly two centuries later.7 Following the discovery of the causal 
1. Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 801 (1982». 
2. Clague, Determining Eligibility for Black-Lung Compensation, 97 MONTHLY LAB. 
REv. 25, 25 (1974). 
3. Pichirallo, Black Lung: Dispute About Diagnosis ofMiners' Ailment, 174 Sci. 132, 
134 (1971). 
4. Id. at 132. 
5. Charles, The Scourge ofBlack Lung: How Much Evidence Is "Enough" to Prove 
Disability?, 1987 PREVIEW 62, 63. 
6. D. HUNTER, THE DISEASES OF OcCUPATIONS 1013 (6th ed: 1978) (quoting J. 
EVELYN, FUMIFUGIUM, OR THE INCONVENIENCE OF THE AER AND SMOAK OF LoNDON 
DISSIPATED (1661». 
Newcastle Cole as an expert Physician affirms, causeth consumptions, phthisicks 
and the indisposition of the lungs, not only 1,>y the suffocating aboundance of 
smoak, but also by its virulency, for all subterrany fuel hath a kind of virulent or 
arsenical vapour rising from it; which, as it speedily destroys those who dig it in 
the mines, so does it, by little and little, those who use it here above them. 
Id. 
7. Id. In 1831, a physician named J.C. Gregory reported that the disease had its 
, 	 origin in coal mining, but the specific cause of the disease remained unknown. Id. Other 
physicians theorized that "the effects of blasting with gunpowder or ... the inltalation of 
... soot from the oil-lamps of the Ininers" caused the disease. Id. In 1833, W. Marshall, a 
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link, improvements in both ventilation and sanitation of coal mines led 
to a widespread belief at the end of the nineteenth century that pneu­
moconiosis had been eliminated as a health threat.s The mechaniza­
tion of the coal mining industry early in the twentieth century, 
however, greatly increased the amount of dust in the mines and 
thereby caused a recurrence of lung disease among the miners. 9 
Years after this mechanization-induced reappearance of black 
lung, the federal government enacted a series of ~tatuteslO authorizing 
payment of benefits to miners who were totally disabled by the dis­
ease. 11 One statutel2 restrictively delegated the establishment of a def-
physician studying three career coal miners, asserted that "the inhalation of fine coal dust 
and its deposition in the substance of the lung was the cause of [black lung]." Id. at 1013­
14. 
8. Id. at 1014. 
9. Id. at 1014-16. It was during this mechanization period that the works of John 
Scott Haldane, a physiologist of international repute, led the mining industry engineers 
astray. Haldane's previous accomplishments were notable. He was recognized for his de­
velopment of the apparatus and methodology used in blood gas analysis and also for his 
work leading to the practice of stone-dustitlg in coal mines to control underground explo­
sions. Additionally, he was appointed a professor of physiology at Oxford and acted as a 
director of the Mining Research Laboratory of the University of Bimtingham. Id. With 
impressive credentials, Haldane turned his attention to the study of silicosis in miners in 
the metalliferous mines. Silicosis is a lung disease caused by long-term inhalation of silica 
dust generated during excavation of silica, a crystalline compound that consists of silicon 
and oxygen, and which is found as quartz, sand, flint, agate, and other minerals. THE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1205 (6th ed. 1976). 
Haldane noted a high tuberculosis death rate among metalliferous miners and a compara­
tively low tuberculosis death rate among coal miners. From this finding, he concluded that 
"the inhalation of coal dust causes no danger to life but on the contrary gives even protec­
tion against the development of tuberculosis." D. HUNTER, THE DISEASE OF OcCUPA­
TIONS 1016 (6th ed. 1978). In the wake of Haldane's conclusion, mining industry engineers 
did not attempt to reduce the amount of coal dust being generated by mechanization. Id. at 
1017. The current plight of coal miners may thus be attributed, at least in part, to the 
incorrect presumptions of the medical profession. Id. (quoting C.M. Fletcher, 
Pnuemoconiosis o/Coal-Miners, 1948 BRIT. MED. J. 1015, 1016 (vol. 1). "It must be ad­
mitted that medical men by their ill-informed complacency have a heavy load of responsi­
bility to bear for the present high incidence of pneumoconiosis among coal miners." Id. 
Regardless of who is to blame, coal miners have suffered greatly. 
10. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 
742 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 801 (1982»; Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. 
L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.); Black 
Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (1978) (codified in 
scattered sections of 30 U.S. C.). 
11. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, tit. IV, 83 
Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-45 (1982»; Black Lung Benefits Act of 
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 g 
U.S.C.); Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239,92 Stat. 95 (1978) 
(codified in scattered sections of 30 U.S. C.). 
12. Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95-96 
(1978) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 902(f)(I), (2) (1982». 
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initional standard for "total disability" to the Department of Labor. 
There is a dispute, however, as to whether the Department of Labor 
standard is consistent with the statute's restrictive delegation. Several 
United States courts of appeals I 3 have found that the Secretary of La­
bor violated the congressional directive that the standards established 
"not be more restrictive than the criteria [of the interim standards es­
tablished by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare 
(HEW)]."14 The dispute turns on whether the statutory term "crite­
ria" refers only to the medical evaluation criteria established by the 
Secretary of HEW, or alternatively whether it includes the presump­
tions and evidentiary provisions as well. 
This note discusses and evaluates the conflicting interpretations of 
this controversial provision of the black lung benefits program. Sec­
tion One provides an overview of title IV of the Federal Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act, including its amendments. IS Section Two dis­
cusses the leading cases which have developed conflicting interpreta­
tions of the statute. 16 Finally, Section Three examines and evaluates 
the courts' interpretations in light of traditional canons of statutory 
construction, the legislative history, and the scope ofjudicial review of 
administrative agency decisions. 17 
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE BLACK 

LUNG BENEFITS PROGRAM 

The impetus for the first black lung benefits legislation was a dis­
astrous mine accident that claimed seventy-eight lives in Consolidated 
Coal Company's No. 9 minel8 in Farmington, West Virginia. 19 
Although the explosion did not relate directly to the issue of black 
lung disease, it focused attention on the overall lack of protection for 
13. Broyles v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 824 F.2d 327 
(4th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1288 (1988); Kyle v. Director, Office of Workers' 
Compensation Programs, 819 F.2d 139 (6th err. 1987), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L. W. 
3463 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1987) (No. 87-1045); Coughlan v. Director, Office of Workers' Com­
pensation Programs, 757 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1986); Halon v. Director, Office of Workers' 
Compensation Programs, 713 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1983). ' 
14. 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(2) (1982) (emphasis added). The Department of Health, Ed­
ucation, and Welfare has since been partitioned, and the relevant segment has been 
redesignated as the Department of Health and Human Services. For simplicity, this note 
uses the designation HEW. 
15. See infra notes 18-67 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 68-118 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 119-98 and accompanying text. 
18. Coles & Huge, ''Black Lung" Mining as a Way ofDeath, 160 NEW REpUB. 17, 
19 (1969). 
19. Pichirallo, supra note 3, at 132. 
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the health and safety of coal miners.2o Shortly after the disaster, Con­
gress enacted the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.21 
Title IV of the Act, captioned "Black Lung Benefits," directs 
assistance to those miners who are totally disabled by black lung and 
to survivors of those who have died from the disease. 22 It was a legis­
lative act recognizing the nation's indebtedness to coal miners who fell 
victim to pneumoconiosis while providing vital fuel for the nation.23 
Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 
establishes a two-part framework for the black lung benefits program. 
The Secretary of HEW and the Secretary of Labor oversee the two 
components, designated respectively24 Part B2S and Part C.26 The 
date of filing determines whether a claim is a Part B or a Part C claim. 
Prior to amendment of the 1969 Act, claims filed on or before Decem­
ber 31, 1972, were reviewed under Part B, while claims filed after that 
date were reviewed under Part C.27 There is a major economic differ­
ence between the benefits authorized by the two parts.. Part B benefits 
are reduced by one dollar for every two dollars of earnings above an 
annual earnings exemption, regardless of the source of the earnings.28 
Part C benefits are not reduced by additional earnings.29 A miner or a 
beneficiary can draw full Part C benefits even while earning income 
20. Id. See also Cook, The 1977 Amendments to the Black Lung Benefits Law, 101 
MONTHLY LAB. REv. 25,25 (1978). 
21. Compare Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 
83 Stat. 742 with Act of May 7, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-49, 55 Stat. 177; Act of July 16, 1952, 
Pub. L. No. 82-552,66 Stat. 692; Federal Coal Mine Safety Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. 
L. No. 89-376, 80 Stat. 84 (1966) (while not the first mine safety act, the 1969 statute was 
unique in its provision for black lung benefits). 
22. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, tit. IV, 83 
Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-45 (1982». 
23. HOUSE CoMM. ON Eouc. ANO LABOR, 920 CoNG., 20 SESS., SUMMARY ANO 
EXPLANATION OF THE BLACK LUNG BENEFITS ACT OF 1972 [hereinafter SUMMARY AND 
EXPLANATION] (foreword of Chairman Perkins) (Comm. Print 1972). 
24. 30 U.S.C. §§ 921-25, 30 U.S.C. §§ 931-41 (1976). 
25. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 
792, 793 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 921 (1982». 
26. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 
792, 795 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 931 (1982». 
27. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 
792, 793-95 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 921-31 (1982». 
28. 30 U.S.C. § 922(b) (1982). 
29. "[T)here is no statutory provision in Part C for an offset against Black Lung 
benefit amounts due to receipt of unemployment compensation or on account of excess 
earnings." Fisher v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., [1978] BRBS (M-B) 914, 917, BRB No. 77­
151 BLA. A fonner miner claiming disability benefits will be disqualified by outside em­
ployment if it is shown to be "gainful work" in the immediate area of his residence and 
requires skills and abilities comparable to those of any mine work in which the individual 
previously engaged. 20 C.F.R. § 41O.421(a)(1) (1988). • 
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from outside employment. 30 
The 1969 Act authorized the Secretary of HEW to establish stan­
dards for reviewing benefits claims filed under Part B and C.3l The 
procedures established by the Secretary for Part B and Part C differed 
greatly, as the following discussion documents. 
A. Part B of Title IV 
Part B of the 1969 Act directed the Secretary of HEW to estab­
lish' regulations for identifying "total disability" and death "due to 
pneumoconiosis."32 In order to be eligible' for a Part B claim, the 
claimant must have filed previously under the applicable state work­
ers' compensation law.33 This requirement was waived, however, if 
such filing would have been futile because of the expiration of the filing 
period, if pneumoconiosis was not compensable under such law, or if, 
in the opinion of the Secretary, filing would be fruitless.34 If a miner 
timely filed and established a Part B claim, the federal government 
provided lifetime benefits under the 1969 Act. 35 
30. Falk, Counseling the Coal Miner Suffering from Respiratory Disease, 83 W. VA. 
L. REv. 833, 845-46 (1981). 
31. 30 U.S.C. §§ 902(f), 932(h) (1976). 
32. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, tit. IV, 83 
Stat. 792,793 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 921 (1982». The only limitation on the 
Secretary's authority was that the regulation established could not provide more restrictive 
criteria than those applicable under § 223(d) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 223(d) 
(1982). Section 223( d) establishes disability criteria for determining eligibility for social 
security insurance benefits. Id. 
While it has some similarities with the coal workers' pneumoconiosis benefits pro­
gram, the social security disability insurance program is different in two respects. U.S. 
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, FiRST ANNuAL REPORT ON PART B OF TI­
TLE IV OF THE FED. CoAL MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT OF 1969 ch.III, 8 (1971) 
[hereinafter ANNuAL REPORT]. First, under the social security program, a disabled 
worker is entitled to benefits based on the disability without regard to the extent and cause 
of his or her impairment. Id. A coal miner, on the other hand, is entitled to benefits under 
the Black Lung Benefits Act only if the impairment is both totally disabling and due to 
pneumoconiosis. Id. Second, under the social security program, the worker need not es­
tablish a causal connection between the illness and employment, however the coal miner 
must show that the pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine employment. Id. However, the 
1969 Act does have a provision which permits a rebuttable presumption that lightens the 
coal miner's burden of establishing "causality." An affiicted miner who worked ten or 
more years in the mines could rely on the rebuttable presumption that the affiiction was due 
to that employment. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91­
173, tit. IV, 83 Stat. 792, 793 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 921(c) (1982». 
33. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, tit. IV, 83 
Stat. 792, 794 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C § 923(c) (1982». 
34. Id. As late as May, 1978, the Department of Labor had not found a state com­
pensation law that "adequately cover(ed] black lung disease." Cook, supra note 20, at 28. 
35. Solomons, A Critical Analysis of the Legislative History Surrounding the Black 
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B. Part C of Title IV 
Part C was vastly different from federally funded Part B. Part C 
was designed to operate like a statutory workers' compensation 
scheme, whereby an employer was liable for the amount of the claimed 
benefits if responsibility for the employee's injury could be assessed 
against that employer.36 As originally enacted, Part C was similar to 
Part B in that a claim filed under Part C of the federal program first 
was directed to an applicable state workers' compensation program for 
settlement. If the state program did not cover pneumoconiosis, or 
otherwise was inadequate, the .Secretary of Labor could process the 
claim under Part C.37 The Secretary of Labor was empowered to iden­
tify a liable coal mine employer and assess it for the benefits paid to 
the claimant.38 If the Secretary could not identify a responsible em­
ployer, then the Secretary was authorized to pay the claimed benefits 
from federal funds. 39 
C. Amendments to Title IV 
This section reviews the legislative evolution of the black lung 
benefits program from 1968 to 1977. The first subsection outlines the 
initial administrative activity following the enactment of the black 
lung benefits program in 1969 and Congress' response to that activity. 
The next subsection reviews the 1972 amendment and introduces 
HEW's interim standards, which play a key role in the dispute over 
the meaning of the term "criteria." Finally, the third subsection ex­
amines the 1977 amendment, briefly compares and contrasts the Secre­
tary of Labor's adopted standards with the Secretary of HEW's 
interim standards, and then delineates the dispute created by the lan­
guage of section 902(f)(2). 
1. The 1969 Act 
Part B of the 1969 Act quickly became a topic of debate. In car-
Lung Interim Presumption and a Survey of its Unresolved Issues, 83 W. VA. L. REv. 869, 
870 n.5 (1981). 
36. Halon v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 713 F.2d 21, 26 
(3d Cir. 1983) (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting). See also Federal Coal Mine Health 
and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91·173, tit. IV, 83 Stat. 792, 796 (codified as amended 
at 30 U.S.C. § 932 (1982». 
37. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, tit. IV, 83 
Stat. 792, 795 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 931(a) (1982». 
38. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, tit. IV, 83 
Stat. 792, 796 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 932 (1982». 
39. [d. 
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rying out the congressionally imposed duty of developing appropriate 
diagnostic determinants of claimant eligibility,40 the Secretary of 
HEW adopted the much criticized41 X-ray diagnosis,42 according to 
which a negative X-ray was positive proof of the absence of pneumo­
coniosis.43 Under the X-ray diagnosis standard, the approval rate of 
Part B claims was less than fifty percent.44 Advocates of a more relia­
ble diagnosis criticized the accuracy ,of the X-ray as a definitive test for 
pneumoconiosis,4s but, in spite of mounting evidence of its fallibility, 46 
the X-ray diagnostic standard was defended and maintained by 
HEW.47 Dissatisfied with HEW's performance in administering Part 
B in general, and the X-ray standard in particular, Congress amended 
the 1969 Act in 1972.48 
2. The 1972 Amendment 
The 1972 amendment to the 1969 Act was aimed at liberalizing 
eligibility requirements and reducing the large backlog of pending Part 
B claims.49 In addition to the amendment, Congress exerted pressure 
40. See Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, tit. 
IV, 83 Stat. 792, 793 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C § 923 (1982». 
41. See, e.g., SUMMARY AND EXPLANATION, supra note 23, at III; De Muth, Sub­
verting the Black Lung Law, 125 AMERICA 530, 530-31 (1971). 
42. "Simple pneumoconiosis" is evidenced by the presence of small opacities 
that are measured by type, profusion, and the area of the lung affected. X-ray 
results for this stage of the disease fall into four classifications, ranging from Cate­
gory 0, or no indication of the disease, to Category III, which shows numerous 
small opacities that partially or totally obscure the normal markings of the lung. 
Clague, supra note 2, at 25. 
43. ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 18. 
44. SENATE CoMM. ON LABOR AND PuBLIC WELFARE, 92D CoNG., 2D SESS., 
BLACK LUNG BENEFITS ACT OF 1972 V (foreword of Chairman Harrison Williams) 
(Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE]. 
45. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, INTERDEPARTMENTAL WORKERS' CoMPENSATION 
TASK FORCE CoNFERENCE REPORT - BLACK LUNG, A STUDY IN OccUPATIONAL DIS­
EASE CoMPENSATION 742, 756 (1977) [hereinafter TASK FORCE]. 
46. ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 7. 
47. TASK FORCE, supra note 45, at 756-57. 
48. SUMMARY AND EXPLANATION, supra note 23, at III. 

[I]n spite of legislative history clearly indicating that the X-ray was to be only one 

of many types of evidence to be used to determine the existence of pneumoconio­

sis, and in spite of the medical knowledge [in other countries as well as in the 
United States] that negative chest X-rays did not necessarily disprove the exist­
ence of pneumoconiosis, the Department [of HEW] adopted a policy of denying 
black lung benefits solely on the basis of a negative chest X-ray. 
Id. 
49. LABOR AND PuBLIC WELFARE, supra note 44, at 15 (General Statement). The 
language of the 1972 amendment is as follows: 
(f) The first sentence of section 413(b) of such Act is amended by inserting 
before the period at the end thereof the following: .. , but no claim for benefits 
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on the Secretary of HEW to adopt interim standards to expedite pend­
ing Part B claims while permanent regulations were being developed. 50 
The Secretary of HEW responded to the congressional pressure by 
promulgating the interim adjudicatory rules in 1972.51 Applicable 
only to Part B claims, the rules established a presumption whereby a 
person who worked in a mine for ten or more years is presumed totally 
disabled if certain medical requirements are met. 52 If the claimant can 
establish the existence of pneumoconiosis but cannot meet the re­
quired ten years of employment, an evidentiary provision of the in­
terim rules nevertheless allows a presumption of total disability if the 
claimant can prove that the disease arose out of coal mine 
employment.53 
Congressional pressure to adopt interim standards for expeditious 
claim processing pertained only to Part B of the program. HEW al­
ready had established· permanent medical standards for Part C. S4 
under this part shall be denied solely on the basis of the results of a chest roent­
genogram. In determining the validity of claims under this part, all relevant evi­
dence shall be considered, including, where relevant, medical tests such as blood 
gas studies, X-ray examination, electrocardiogram, pulmonary function studies, 
or physical performance tests, and any medical history, evidence submitted by the 
claimant's physician, or his wife's affidavits, and in the case of a deceased miner, 
other appropriate affidavits of persons with knowledge of the miner's physical 
condition, and other supportive materials." 
(g) The amendments made by this section shall be effective as of December 30, 
1969. 
Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, tit. IV, 86 Stat. ISO, 154 (codified as 
amended at 30 U.S.C. § 923 (1982». 
50. 20 C.F.R. § 41O.49O(a) (1988). See also Halon v. Director, Office of Workers' 
Compensation Programs, 713 F.2d 21, 26 (1983) (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting); 
Solomons, supra note 35, at 871. 
51. 20 C.F.R. § 410.490 (1988). The interim adjudicatory rules only were applicable 
to a miner's Part B claims filed on or before June 30, 1973, and to survivors' claims if the 
miner died before January I, 1974. Id. Any claim filed subsequently was reviewed under 
permanent standards which were drafted during the interim period. 
52. A miner employed for 10 or more years would be presumed totally disabled if the 
claimant established the existence of pneumoconiosis by X-ray, biopsy, or autopsy. 20 
C.F.R. §§ 41O.49O(bXl)(i), 41O.49O(b)(3) (1988). The Secretary of HEW intended the 
medical criteria in the interim presumption to detect merely the disease, not the disabling 
effects of it. "[T]here were too many claims ... to allow 'physical performance tests.'. . . 
[I]t was necessary to establish 'criteria which would detect disease,' but not necessarily a 
disabling level of impairment." Halon, 713 F.2d at 27-28 (Weis, J., concurring and dissent­
ing) (quoting statements made during Senate hearings, Oversight 0/the Admin. 0/the Black 
Lung Benefits Program 1977: Hearings Be/ore the Subcomm. on Labaro/the Senate Comm. 
on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 193 (1977) [hereinafter Oversight] (statement of 
Herbert Blumenfeld, M.D., Chief, Medical ConSUlting Staff, Bureau of Disability Insur­
ance, Social Security Administration». 
53. 20 C.F.R. § 41O.416(b) (1988), 20 C.F.R. § 41O.456(b) (1988). 
54. 20 C.F.R. § 410.401-10, 476 (1988). 
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Those permanent standards, however, proved much more burdensome 
to claimants than the interim standards of Part B claims; Conse­
quently, the approval rate of Part C claims noticeably lagged behind 
that of Part B claims. 55 In response to the discrepancy, Congress once 
again mobilized to amend the Act. 
3. The 1977 Amendment 
The 1977 amendment develoPed after much debate in the House 
and Senate subcommittees and between the House and Senate. As 
early as 1975, the House considered several amendments directing the 
Secretary of HEW to rewrite the Part C regulations to conform to the 
Part B interim regulations. 56 Parties who were opposed to those regu­
lations argued that the medical criteria incorporated into the interim 
standards of Part B were not accurate scientifically. 57 Nevertheless, in 
1976, the House approved H.R. 10760, which directed the Secretary of 
HEW to promulgate regulations for Part C claims which "shall not 
provide more restrictive criteria than those applicable to a claim filed 
on June 30, 1973."58 The Senate rejected the House bill by neglecting 
to act on it prior to adjournment. In J977, the House approved a new 
bill with identical language. 59 
The Senate Subcommittee on Labor heard testimony from oppo­
nents of the HEW interim standards. Representatives of the Depart­
ment of Labor stressed that because Parts B and C were different in 
nature, the Department should not be forced to adopt the Part B in­
terim standards but should be permitted to draft its own.60 The De­
partment of Labor persuaded the Senate to adopt a bill that, unlike the 
House bill, empowered the Department of Labor to draft its own stan­
dards for Part C without reference to the HEW interim regulations.61 
55. Solomons, supra note 35, at 873. See also Halon, 713 F.2d at 26 (Weis, J., con­
curring and dissenting). 
56. Halon, 713 F.2d at 28 (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting). 
57. Id. at 26. 
58. H.R. 10760, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 7(a) (1976), 122 CONGo REC. 4959-99 (1976), 
reprinted in Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of1977, Committee on Education and Labor 
77, 83 (1979). A claim filed on June 30, 1973 would be reviewed according to the provi­
sions of the HEW's interim standards. 
59. H.R. 4544, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1977), 123 CoNG. REc. 29,828-51 
(1977); Halon, 713 F.2d at 27 (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting). 
60. Oversight, supra note 52, at 142. 
61. S. 1538, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(c) (1977). Empowering the Secretary of Labor 
to promulgate regulations for Part C was a significant change in the black lung benefits 
program. Since the inception of the program, it had been the duty of the Secretary of HEW 
to promulgate regulations for both Part B and Part C. See supra note 31 and accompany­
ing text. 
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The House and Senate bills were sent to a conference committee, 
which produced a compromise version that Congress enacted as the 
Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977.62 The statute empowered 
the Secretary of Labor, for Part C claims, to establish criteria for med­
ical tests which accurately would reflect total disability in coal min­
ers.63 Pursuant to this amendment, the Secretary of Labor 
promulgated section 727.203 of title 20 of the Code of Federal Regula­
tions for reviewing claims under Part C.64 
These regulations adopted evaluative medical criteria that were 
identical to those contained in the HEW interim standards,6s and es­
tablished a similar presumption of total disability for a claimant able 
to prove ten years of coal mine employment. While appearing similar, 
there is a critical difference between using the HEW interim stan­
dards66 and using the Secretary of Labor's standards. Under the Sec­
retary of Labor's standards, a claimant satisfying the medical criteria 
but not the requisite ten years of employment was not provisionally 
62. Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (1978) 
(codified at 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(2) (1982»; The compromise version conforms to the Senate 
amendment in providing the Secretary of Labor with the power to draft the regulations for 
Part C. CoNFERENCE CoMM. JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE CoMM. OF 
CONFERENCE, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 886 (1977). 
63. 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(1) (1982) provides: 

The term "total disability" has the meaning given it by regulations of the Secre­

tary of ... [HEW] for claims under part B of this subchapter, ... subject to the 

relevant provisions of subsections (b) and (d) of section 923 of this title, except 
that· 
(D) the Secretary of Labor, in consultation with the Director of the National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, shall establish criteria for all appro­
priate medical tests under this subsection which accurately reflect total disability 
in coal miners as defined in subparagraph (A). 
64. The 1977 amendment extended the limits of the Secretary of Labor's standards 
beyond Part C claims through the inclusion of a provision whereby all pending or previ­
ously denied claims, upon request of the claimant, would be either: 1) referred directly by 
the Secretary of HEW to the Secretary of Labor for determination using the new Part C 
standards, or 2) reviewed by the Secretary of Labor using Part C standards after being 
denied by the Secretary of HEW under Part B review. Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95, 103 § 15 (1978) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. 
§ 945 (1982». Previously-denied Part B claims which had been filed after the June 30, 
1973 cut-off date were likely candidates for review under the less demanding Part C stan­
dards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. 
65. The Secretary of Labor's regulations adopted the exact medical criteria estab­
lished by the Secretary of HEW, while adding several other medical tests through which a 
claimant could establish a claim. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5) 
(1988) with 20 C.F.R. § 41O.49O(b) (1988). See also Halon v. Director, Office of Workers' 
Compensation Programs, 713 F.2d 21, 29 (3d Cir. 1983) (Weis, J., concurring and 
dissenting). 
66. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52. 
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permitted to take advantage of the presumption through proof that the 
disease arose from coal mine employment. 
The absence of the evidentiary provision differentiates the HEW 
interim standards from the Secretary of Labor's standards, and is at 
the center of the dispute. Section 902(f)(2) directs the Secretary of 
Labor to promulgate standards that would "not be more restrictive 
than the criteria [of the interim standards established by the Secretary 
of HEW]."67 Because the standards ~tablished by the Secretary of 
Labor condition availability of the presumption of total disability on 
proof of ten years of employment and do not include an alternate evi­
dentiary provision, they are more restrictive than the interim pre­
sumption established by the Secretary of HEW. If Congress intended 
the term "criteria" to include medical evaluation criteria, presump­
tions, and evidentiary provisions, then the Secretary of Labor violated 
section 902(f)(2) by promulgating the presumption without the ac­
companying evidentiary provision. Conversely, if Congress intended 
the term "criteria" to include only medical evaluation criteria, then 
the Secretary of Labor complied with the statute. The next section of 
this note examines recent cases which have interpreted the term "crite­
ria" as it appears in 30 U.S.C. section 902(f)(2), and explores whether 
the Secretary of Labor violated that section by promulgating 20 
C.F.R. section 727.203. 
II. "CRITERIA" INTERPRETED 
The controversy over the interpretation of the term "criteria" ap­
pearing in 30 U.S.C. section 902(f)(2) swiftly is coming to a head. The 
United States Supreme Court is expected to decide whether the Secre­
tary of Labor violated 30 U.S.C. section 902(f)(2) when it hears argu­
ments in Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. 
Broyles.68 Because the Broyles opinion substantively is a cursory reit­
eration of the exhaustive opinion in Halon v. Director, Office of Work­
ers' Compensation Programs,69 this note focuses its discussion on the 
latter. 
Two United States Circuit Courts of Appeals70 have shaped the 
67. 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(2) (1982) (emphasis added). 
68. 824 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1288 (1988). 
69. 713 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1983). 
70. Strike v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 817 F.2d 395 
(7th Cir. 1987); Halon v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 713 F.2d 
21 (3d Cir. 1983). Three additional courts of appeals have decided cases on point, and have 
adopted the reasoning of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rather than engaging in their 
own analyses. See Broyles v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 824 
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opposing viewpoints concerning the interpretation of the term "crite­
ria" in 30 U.S.C. section 902(f)(2).71 Both courts employed similar 
approaches in defining the term but reached different results. In ac­
cordance with traditional canons of statutory construction, the courts 
first examined the plain meaning of the language of the statute72 and 
then reviewed its legislative history.73 Going a step further, one court 
considered policy arguments supporting a particular interpretation of 
the statute.74 The following discussion presents the two cases. The 
subsequent section evaluates the competing arguments raised in the 
cases and discusses the important issue of scope of judicial review of 
an administrative agency decision. This latter issue was not addressed 
by the reviewing courts. 
A. Halon v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs 7S 
On August 28,.1974, Mrs. Bertha Kubilus, the widow of a man 
who had been a coal miner for approximately eight years, filed a claim 
with the Secretary of HEW under Part B of the Black Lung Benefits 
F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1288 (1988); Kyle v. Director, Office of 
Workers' Compensation Programs, 819 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed, 56 
U.S.L.W. 3463 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1987) (No. 87-1045); Coughlan V. Director, Office of Work­
ers' Compensation Programs, 757 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1985). 
71. 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(2) (1982) reads: 

Criteria applied by the Secretary of Labor in the case of­
(A) any claim which is subject to review by the Secretary of ... [HEW], or 
subject to a detennination by the Secretary of Labor, under section 945(a) of this 
title; 
(B) any claim which is subject to review by the Secretary of Labor under 
section 945(b) of this title; and 
(C) any claim filed on or before the effective date of regulations promul­
gated under this subsection by the Secretary of Labor; shall not be more restric­
tive than the criteria applicable to a claim filed on June 30, 197~, whether or not 
the final disposition of any such claim occurs after the date of such promulgation 
of regulations by the Secretary of Labor. <. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
72. See 2 J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 366, at 
698 (J. Lewis 2d ed. 1904). "Where ... resolution of a question of federal law turns on a 
statute and the intention of Congress, , , [courts] look first to the statutory language and 
then to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear," Blum V. Stenson, 465 
U,S. 886, 896 (1984), "It is elementary that the meaning of the statute must, in the first 
instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, ' , , the 
sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its tenns," Caminetti v, United 
States, 242 U,S. 470, 485 (1917) (citations omitted), 
73, "But words are inexact tools at best, and for that reason there is wisely no rule of 
law forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history no matter how 'clear the words may 
appear on "superficial examination."'" Harrison v, Northern Trust Co" 317 U.S. 476, 479 
(1943) (quoting United States v, American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S, 534, 543-44 (1940». 
74. Halon, 713 F,2d at 24-25, 
75. 713 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1983). 
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Act of 1972. Because Mr. Kubilus died prior to January 1, 1974,76 the 
claim was reviewed using the Part B interim standards.77 Although 
Mrs. Kubilus supplied evidence establishing that her husband had 
pneumoconiosis, the Secretary of HEW denied the claim because she 
was unable to prove the requisite ten years of coal mine employment.78 
Subsequent to the passage of the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 
1977, Mr. Charles Halon79 requested review of the previously denied 
claim.80 The Secretary of HEW again denied the claim. In accord­
ance with the 1977 amendment,81 the Secretary of HEW then referred 
the claim to the Secretary of Labor for review under Part C standards. 
Under the Part C standards, as promulgated by the Secretary of La- . 
bor, the claim was denied once more.82 Mr. Halon appealed the deci­
sion to the Benefits Review Board,83 which upheld the Secretary of 
Labor's decision.84 
Halon sought review of the Board's decision in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,8S claiming that the board 
erred in not interpreting 30 U.S.C. section 902(f)(2) to mandate appli­
cation of the presumption of total disability as set forth in 20 C.F.R. 
76. The fact that Mr. Kubilus died prior to January I, 1974, is inferred from the 
court's statement that 20 C.F.R. § 41O.49O(b) was the regulation relevant to the case. 
Halon, 713 F.2d at 23. See supra note 51. 
77. See supra note 51. 
78. Under 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(I) (1982), a survivor establishing 10 years of coal mine 
employment is entitled to the rebuttable presumption that the decedent's pneumoconiosis 
arose out of such employment. Absent proof of 10 years of employment, a survivor must 
prove that decedent had contracted pneumoconiosis as a result of that employment. 
79. Mrs. Kubilus died while her claim was pending. Charles J. Halon, Jr., the ap­
pointed executor of her estate, petitioned for review of the denied benefits claim. Halon, 
713 F.2d at 22. 
80. See supra note 64 for the 1977 amendment provisions regarding review of previ­
ously denied claims. 
81. See supra note 64 for the 1977 amendment provisions regarding review by the 
Secretary of Labor under Part C standards. 
82. Halon, 713 F.2d at 23. 
83. The Benefits Review Board is a regulatory institution designed to take the place 
of federal district courts in hearing appeals. The purpose is to facilitate "uniformity and 
continuity to the judicial interpretation of the Black Lung Act." Smith, Black Lung Bene­
fits Reform Act of1977-Complicated But Simple, Ky. BENCH & B., Apr. 1979, at 20, 20. 
84. Halon, 713 F.2d at 24. Stating that improper criteria were used in reaching the 
decision, Judge Miller of the Review Board dissented on the ground "that by virtue of 30 
U.S.C. § 902(f)(2), Mrs. Kubilus was entitled to the presumption of the cause of the per­
manent disability in 20 C.F.R. § 41O.49O(b)." Id. at 24. 
85. The claims procedure under the black lung benefits program begins with an ini­
tial determination, followed by an informal conference, then a hearing before an adminis­
trative law judge, appeal to the Benefits Review Board, and further appeal to the United 
States Circuit Court of Appeals where the claim originated. 33 U.S.C. §§ 919, 921; 20 
C.F.R. § 720.200, 20 C.F.R. § 725.401. 
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section 41O.490(b), HEW's interim standards.86 After reviewing the 
plain language of the statute,87 the legislative history,88 and policy ar­
guments, the court construed section 902(f)(2) to require the use of 
the interim standard presumption provisions.89 
The government contended that "[section] 902(f)(2) should be 
understood as if it read: 'Medical criteria applied by the Secretary of 
Labor in case[s] of [adjudications pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 945] shall 
not be more restrictive than- the medical criteria applicable to a claim 
filed on June 30, 1973.'''90 In support of its position, the government 
referred to specific comments made during congressional debate, and 
argued that adoption of the section 41O.490(b) presumption would be 
costly.91 
To persuade the court that the term "criteria" in section 
902(f)(2) was not a generic term, the government cited several refer­
ences to medical criteria made during legislative debate. First, Repre­
sentative Paul Simon, a member of the House subcommittee and of the 
conference committee responsible for drafting the bill, stated that the 
language of the bill is clear in that" '[t]he Department of Labor is 
required to apply medical criteria no more restrictive than criteria be­
ing used ... on June 30, 1973.' "92 Then, during Senate debate on the 
conference committee bill, Senator Jennings Randolph commented 
that the Department of Labor's review of previously denied claims 
" 'will be accomplished with the use of the "interim" medical stan­
dards which were in use after the Black Lung Amendments of 
1972.' "93 Finally, the conference committee reported that the com­
promise version of the bill " 'conforms to the Senate amendment with 
the proviso that the so-called "interim" part B medical startdards are 
to be applied to all reviewed and pending claims.' "94 
The court rejected the government's reading of the statute, stating 
that the "plain language of the statute does not suggest that Congress 
86. Halon, 713 F.2d at 24. 
87. Id. For an analysis of the Halon court's review of the statutory language, see 
infra notes 122-43 and accompanying text. 
88. Halon, 713 F.2d at 24. For an analysis of the legislative history, see infra notes 
144-54 and accompanying text. . 
89. Halon, 713 F.2d at 24-25. Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Weis 
rejected the majority's broad reading of section 902(f)(2). Halon, 713 F.2d at 25 (Weis, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
90. Id. at 24 (citation omitted). 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 29 (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing 124 CONGo REC. 3431 
(1978». 
93. Id. (citing 124 CONGo REC. 2331 (1978». 
94. Id. at 28-29 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 864, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1978». 
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intended any such modification of the generic term 'criteria.' "95 In 
dismissing the government's interpretation of the legislative history, 
the court stated that "[r]eferences in debate to medical criteria are not 
dispositive, since medical criteria are included [in the text of the stat­
ute]."96 The court cited other congressional remarks that suggested 
that "criteria" included both adjudicatory and medical standards. 97 
The government argued that the additional costs of requiring the 
presumption could be as great as $190,800,000.00.98 In response, the 
court stated that the whole rehearing mechanism mandated by 30 
U.S.c. section 945 was costly and that the overall thrust of the 
amended act was to liberalize the standards for availability of bene­
fits.99 The court offered an additional policy argument, suggesting 
that the interpretation the government proffered "would produce the 
anomalous result that in cases adjudicated [by the Secretary of HEW] 
the ... presumption would apply, whereas in cases transferred to the 
Secretary of Labor it would not."lOO 
In his concurring and dissenting opinion,101 Judge Weis con­
cluded that the legislative history supported the Department of La­
bor's reading of section 902(f)(2)}02 He commented that "[t]he 
testimony of hearing witnesses, the reports of the congressional com­
mittees, and the statements of the legislators who guided the legisla­
95. Id. at 24. 
96. Id. 
97. Representative Carl Perkins stated: 
All claims filed before the date that the Secretary of Labor promulgates new med­
ical standards under part C are subject to evaluation under standards that are no 
more restrictive than those in effect as of June 30, 1973. And that means the so­
called interim standards. These are the standards HEW has applied under part B 
and they are the precise and only standards HEW will apply to these old claims it 
must review according to this legislation. As for the Labor Department, it too 
must apply the interim standards to all of the claims filed under part C, at least 
until such time as the Secretary of Labor promulgates new standards consistent 
with the authority this legislation gives him. 
124 CoNG. REc. 3431 (1978), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE BLACK LUNG 
BENEFITS REFORM ACT AND BLACK LUNG BENEFITS REVENUE ACT OF 1977, at 928-29 
(1979). 
98. Halon, 713 F.2d at 25 n.1 (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting). 
99. Id. at 24. 
100. Id. at 25. The court explained that reading sections 902(f)(2) and 945 together 
"suggests that in cases adjudicated pursuant to section 945 the rules of adjudication will be 
at least as favorable in the Labor Department as in the Department of [HEW)." 
101. Judge Weis concurred in the portion ofthe opinion that found that Mr. Kubilus 
had less than 10 years of coal mine employment and in the decision to remand because of 
the administrative law judge's failure to apply the Secretary of Labor's permanent regula­
tions. Id. at 25 (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting). 
102. Id. at 29. 
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tion from introduction to final passage are all consistent in designating 
the criteria referred to in section 402(f)(2) as 'medical criteria.' "103 
B. Strike v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs 104 
Opal Strike is the widow of Roy Strike, a coal miner of nine and 
one-half years' employment. On June 12, 1975, she filed a claim for 
survivors' benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972. On 
November 28, 1979, the Department of Labor denied the claim. lOS 
After a formal hearing, an administrative law judge concluded that the 
Department of Labor was correct in its denial of the claim. 106 Strike 
appealed the decision to the Benefits Review Board, arguing that sec­
tion 902(f)(2) prohibited the Secretary of Labor from denying the 
claim for failure to prove ten years of coal mine employment. 107 The 
Board rejected Strike's argument and upheld the decision of the ad­
ministrative law judge. 
In her action for review of the Board's decision in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Strike argued that 
Congress intended the term "criteria" in section 902(f)(2) to include 
evidentiary rules and adjudicatory standards, as well as medical stan­
dards. l08 Rejecting her claim, the court examined the plain language 
and the legislative history of the statute and affirmed the Department 
of Labor's interpretation of section 902(f)(2).I09 
The government argued that the statute was ambiguous on its 
face, implying that this ambiguity thus allowed the court to resort to 
legislative history.llo The court readily accepted this view, stating 
that "[w]hen section 902(f) is read as a whole, the plain language of 
the statute in no way unambiguously suggests that the term 'criteria' 
was intended to be generic." 11 I In support of the restrictive reading of 
"criteria," the court pointed to the use of the term in section 
902(f)(1)(D),112 which immediately precedes section 902(f)(2). Read­
103. Id. 
104. 817 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1987). 
105. Strike, 817 F.2d at 399. 
106. Id. at 400. The administrative law judge found that, while medical evidence 
established pneumoconiosis, Mrs. Strike could not prove the requisite 10 years of employ­
ment to take advantage of the interim presumption of total disability. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 400-01. For an analysis of the plain language and legislative history, see 
infra notes 122-54. 
110. Strike, 817 F.2d at 401. See generally infra notes 122-52 and accompanyin~ 
text. 
111. Strike, 817 F.2d at 400-01. 
112. See supra note 63 for the text of 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(1). 
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ing both sections together, "it is certainly arguable ... that the 'crite­
ria' referred to in (f)(2) are the 'criteria for all appropriate medical 
tests ... which accurately reflect total disability in coal miners' which 
the Secretary of Labor was directed to establish in (f)(I)(O)."113 
The court found that Judge Weis' careful review of the legislative 
history in the Halon decision was persuasive and supported a narrow 
interpretation of the term "criteria."114 As presented by Judge Weis, 
the conference committee's only mention of the use of presumptions 
concerned the intention to incorporate the section 411(c) presumption 
into all standards.1lS Section 411(c) presumes that a miner of ten or 
more years' employment, afflicted with pneumoconiosis, derived the 
condition from his or her coal mine employment. 
The court echoed Judge Weis' remark that the standards drafted 
by the Secretary of Labor, including the regulatory standard at issue, 
had been reviewed without comment by the same members of Con­
gress who originally drafted the "not more restrictive" language. 116 
Finally, the court cited a House Report accompanying the bill, which 
stated that "[t]his provision ... [, section 902(f)(2),] would require 
that standards no more restrictive than the 'interim' medical standards 
[under part B] shall be equally applicable to part C claims." 117 The 
fact that this was a House Report, as opposed to Senate Report, is 
particularly significant, in that during the drafting of the 1977 amend­
ment, it was the House version which sought to restrict the new Part C 
standards by tying them to the HEW interim standards. I IS By refer­
ring solely to the "'interim' medical standards," the House Report 
suggests that the sole concern of the House was to restrict the medical 
criteria of the Part C standards. 
Both the Halon and Strike courts confronted the issue of whether 
the term "criteria" appearing in section 902(f)(2) meant medical eval­
uation criteria, presumptions, and evidentiary provisions, or, alterna­
tively, meant only medical evaluation criteria. The Halon court held 
that the plain language of the statute revealed that "criteria" meant 
medical evaluation criteria, presumptions, and evidentiary provisions. 
113. Strike, 817 F.2d at 401. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 403. See also Halon, 713 F.2d at 25, 29 (Weis, J., concurring and 
dissenting). 
116. Strike, 817 F.2d at 404. See also Halon, 713 F.2d at 30 (Weis, J., concurring 
and dissenting). 
117. H.R. REp. No. 151, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE 
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 237,251. This supporting evidence was not mentioned by Judge 
Weis in his concurring and dissenting opinion. 
118. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text. 
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The Strike court held that the statute was ambiguous on its face, and 
that the legislative history revealed that "criteria" meant only medical 
evaluation criteria. 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE HALON AND STRIKE OPINIONS 
This section evaluates the Halon and Strike decisions in light of 
traditional canonS of statutory construction, the legislative history of 
the Act, and the scope of judicial review of an administrative agency 
decision. The first subsection focuses on "the plain meaning rule" and 
its application to section 902(f)(2), with particular attention to the 
role of the "whole statute" rule. 1l9 The following subsection examines 
the persuasiveness of the legislative history arguments raised in both 
Halon and Strike. 120 The final subsection examines the propriety of 
the scope of review applied to the Secretary of Labor's interpretation 
of "criteria" in the two cases; this is an important concept, yet one 
which was not addressed by the Strike or Halon court. 121 
A. Statutory Construction 
Statutory construction invariably begins with "[t]he primary and 
general rule . . . that the intent of the lawmaker is to be found in the 
language that he has used."122 As quoted in the Sutherland treatise, 
" '[w]here the language is plain and admits of no more than one mean­
ing the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to 
aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.' "123 This rule is typically 
termed "the plain meaning rule."124 
The corollary to the plain meaning rule is that if the meaning is 
not plain, that is, where a natural reading of the language connotes 
more than one interit, the statute must be interpreted using standard 
rules of construction. Thus, before the court considers the issue of 
. 119. See infra notes 122-39 and accompanying text. 
120. See infra notes 144-54 and accompanying text. 
121. See infra notes 155-98 and accompanying text. 
122. United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1897). 
123. 2A J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION § 46.01, 
at 73 (N. Singer 4th ed. 1984) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 
(1917». Sutherland stated: 
The statute itself furnishes the best means of its own exposition; and if the sense in 
which words were intended to be used can be clearly ascertained from its parts 
and provisions, the intention thus indicated will prevail without resorting to other 
means of aiding in the construction. 
2 J.G. SUTHERLAND, supra note 72, § 366, at 698-99 (citing Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650 
(1856». 
124. 2A J.G. SUTHERLAND, supra note 123, § 46.01, at 73. 
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whether the legislature intended a broad or restrictive reading of "cri­
teria" in section 902(f)(2), the court must first decide the threshold 
issue of whether the term "criteria" has a plain or an ambiguous 
meaning. If the meaning is plain, the task simply is to apply that 
meaning and look no further. If the meaning is ambiguous, the court 
must probe more deeply to discover the legislative intent. 
In determining whether the statutory language has a plain or an 
ambiguous meaning, a court might proceed in one of two ways. The 
court might focus narrowly on the specific language in the precise sec­
tion of the statute, excluding from examination the remainder of the 
statute, or the court might read the statute in its entirety, extracting 
the plain meaning of anyone part or section from the whole. 
The Halon court applied the plain meaning rule and narrowly 
focused on the language of subsection 902(f)(2). Electing not to ex­
amine other parts of the statute, the court found the language of sec­
tion 902(f)(2) to be simple and concise. 12S The majority opinion 
referred to "criteria" as a generic term, attributing to it great flexibility 
in application. 126 Indeed, as opposed to a technical term of art, the 
word "criteria" is a common word, and should be understood in its 
popular sense. 127 Accordingly, the term "criteria" in section 902(f)(2) 
would encompass all of the elements comprising the HEW interim 
standards. In other words, the Secretary of Labor must not utilize 
more demanding medical test results for proof of the existence of 
pneumoconiosis, nor shall the Secretary of Labor employ a less attain­
able presumption of total disability. 
Because nothing in the language of section 902(f)(2) suggests a 
limitation or restriction on this all-inclusive reading of "criteria," the 
Halon court concluded that the term had but one unambiguous mean­
125. See supra note 71 for text of § 902(f)(2). 
126. Halon v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 713 F.2d 21,24 
(3d Cir. 1983). 
127. "In construing a federal statute it is appropriate to assume that the ordinary 
meaning of the language that Congress employed 'accurately expresses the legislative pur­
pose.''' Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 164 (1985), reh'g denied, 470 U.S. 1065 
(1985) (quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 153, 164 (1985». 
"[I]t should be generally assumed that Congress expresses its purpose through the ordinary 
meaning of the words it uses ...." Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Bond of Mission 
Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 772 (1984), reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984). "A fundamental 
canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted 
as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Perrin v. United States, 444 
U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (citing Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1975». See also 2 J.O. 
SUTHERLAND, supra note 72, § 389, at 747-48. Criteria is defined as "standard[s], rule[s], 
or test[s] on which a judgment or decision can be based." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 314 (6th ed. 1976). 
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ing. 128 In this narrowly focused examination, the language of section 
902(f)(2) suggests an unrestricted application of the term "criteria." 
Such a narrow focus, however, is not in accordance with other princi­
ples of statutory construction. 
Focusing solely on a provision of an act is not definitive as to 
legislative intent, but merely suggests an intent which must be evalu­
ated in relation to other factors.129 An important rule of statutory 
construction is that a statute is 
passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by 
one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section 
should be construed in connection with every other part or section 
so as to produce a harmonious whole. Thus it is not proper to con­
fine interpretation to the one section to be construed. 130 
Because Congress enacted section 902(f)(2) contemporaneously with 
section 902(f)(1),131 both must be read to determine the meaning of 
either. Construing section 902(f)(2) with reference to section 
902(f)(1) creates ambiguity as to the meaning of "criteria."132' 
128. Halon, 713 F.2d at 24. 
129. "[A] single provision will not be interpreted so as to defeat the general purpose 
that animates and informs a particular legislative scheme." Milwaukee County, Wis. v. 
Donovan, 771 F.2d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986). 
"[S]tatutory meaning is of course to be derived, not from the reading of a single sentence or 
section, but from consideration of an entire enactment against the backdrop of its policies 
and objectives." Don't Tear it Down, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Ave. Dev. Corp., 642 F.2d 527, 
533 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
Evaluating the accuracy of a plain meaning interpretation requires: 1) examination of 
"other section[s] of the act [for] expan[sion] or restrict[ion] [of the provision's] meaning"; 
2) determination of whether the "provision itself is repugnant to the general purview of the 
act"; and 3) "consider[ation] in pari materia with other acts, or with the legislative history 
... [for suggestion of] a different meaning." 2A J.G. SUTHERLAND, supra note 123, 
§ 46.01, at 74 (footnote omitted). 
130. 2A J.G. SUTHERLAND, supra note 123, § 46.05, at 90 (footnote omitted). "A 
statute is passed in whole and not piecemeal. Thus, in interpreting a statute, examination 
of the whole, not isolated words, will disclose legislative intent." Moorhead v. United 
States, 774 F.2d 936, 941 (9th Cir. 1985). "'[I]t is an established rule, in construing a 
statute, that the intention of the lawgiver and the meaning of the law are to be ascertained 
by viewing the whole and every part of the Act.''' United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 
1358, 1370 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981) (quoting H. BROOM, A SELEC­
TION OF LEGAL MAxIMS 585 (8th ed. 1882». See also Note, Rules and Aids to Statutory 
Construction, 1 VA. L. REG. 512, 512 (1915); Monnett, Statutory Construction, 52 ALB. L.J.. 
120, 122 (1895). 
131. Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95, 
§ 2(c) (1978). 
132. See supra notes 63 and 113 and accompanying text. The inclusion of a limiting 
reference restricts the definition of "criteria" in § 902(f)(I)(D). In reading the whole stat­
ute, this restriction alerts the reader to the fact that subsequent uses of the term "criteria," 
for example as in § 902(f)(2), also may be restricted. 
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Congress has revised section 902(f) twice, once in 1972 and then 
in 1977. In the original 1969 Act, section 902(f) simply instructed the 
Secretary of HEW to establish regulations defining "total disability" 
for Parts Band C.133 The 1972 amendment altered section 902(f) by 
adding a congressional presumption of "total disability" if the miner is 
unable to perform work comparable to mining. 134 
The 1977 amendment greatly expanded section 902(f), adding 
subsections (1) and (2). Subsection (1) removed the regulatory control 
of Part C from the Secretary of HEW and granted it to the Secretary 
ofLabor. 13S Provisions (1)(A), (l)(B), and (1)(C) imposed restrictions 
on both the Secretary of HEW and the Secretary of Labor in their 
regulation of Parts B and C.136 Provision (1)(0), however, concerns 
only the Secretary of Labor's establishment of criteria for medical tests 
which shall reflect total disability accurately.137 Subsection (2), also 
specific to the Secretary of Labor, imposed the "not more restrictive" 
133. "The term 'total disability' has the meaning given it by regulations of the Secre­
tary of Health, Education, and Welfare, but such regulations shall not provide more restric­
tive criteria than those applicable under section 223(d) of the Social Security Act." Federal 
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, tit. IV, 83 Stat. 793, 
§ 402(f). See supra note 32 for discussion of 42 U.S.C. § 223(d) .(1982). 
134. 
The term "total disability" has the meaning given it by regulations of the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, except that such regulations shall 
provide that a miner shall be considered totally disabled when pneumoconiosis 
prevents him from engaging in gainful employment requiring the skills and abili­
ties comparable to those of any employment in a mine or mines in which he 
previously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of time. 
Such regulations shall not provide more restrictive criteria than those applicable 
under section 223(d) of the Social Security Act. 
Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 153, § 402(f). 
135. Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 
(1978). 
136. Section 902(f)(I)(A) requires that the regulations established by the Secretary 
of HEW and the regulations established by the Secretary of Labor both provide a presump­
~ 	 tion of total disability for a miner who is prevented by pneumoconiosis from engaging in 
gainful employment requiring skills and abilities comparable to those previously utilized 
while employed as a miner. 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(I)(A) (1982). Section 902(f)(1)(B) requires 
that the regulations established by the Secretary of HEW and the regulations established by 
the Secretary of Labor both provide that: I) if a deceased miner was employed in a mine at 
the time of death, such employment shall not be used as conclusive evidence that the miner 
was not totally disabled; and 2) if a living miner is employed in a mine but the employment 
circumstances reflect a change indicative of a diminished capacity to perform usual coal 
mine work, employment in the mine shall not be used as conclusive evidence that the miner 
is not totally disabled. 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(1)(B) (1982). Section 902(f)(I)(C) requires that 
the regulations established by the Secretary of HEW and the regulations established by the 
Secretary of Labor not provide more restrictive criteria than those of section 223(d) of the 
Social Security Act. 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(I)(C). 
137. See supra note 63 for the text of 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(I)(D). 
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limitation on the "criteria" to be applied to claims reviewed or deter­
mined by the Secretary of Labor. 138 In accordance with the canons of 
statutory construction, when read "as a whole," sections 902(f)(1)(D) 
and (f)(2) create some doubt as to the legislative intent for the mean­
ing of "criteria."139 
The converse argument, that occurrence of the same general term 
in both a restricted and unrestricted form within the same act does not 
create ambiguity,l40 is supported by the contention that Congress is 
presumed to act with intent.141 Arguably, Congress knew how to re­
strict the meaning of "criteria" to encompass only medical criteria, 
and it chose to do so only in section 902(f)(1)(D). The logical infer­
ence is that Congress intended an unrestricted meaning of "criteria" in 
section 902(f)(2). 
The weakness of this argument, however, is in its premise. It is 
unrealistic to presume infallibility on the part of Congress. 142 Errors 
and omissions are commonplace. To presume congressional intent 
based on the exclusion of language is to run the risk of reaching an 
interpretation against that which was truly intended. 143 
B. Legislative History 
When a statute, read as a whole, yields an ambiguous legislative 
138. See supra note 71. 
139. See supra notes 63 and 71 for the text of § 902(f)(l)(D) and § 902(f)(2). Sec­
tion (f)(I)(D) uses the language "criteria for all appropriate medical tests," obviously 
meaning medical criteria. Section (f)(2), immediately following § (f)(I)(D), simply uses 
"criteria." The reader is left to ponder whether the "criteria" in § (f)(2) are to be under­
stood as the same criteria earlier referred to in § (f)(1)(D). 
140. See supra note 132 and text accompanying note 113 for a discussion of the 
relationship between § 902(f)(1)(D) and § 902(f)(2). 
141. "[D]ischarge of ... [a court's] obligation to follow the intent of Congress re­
quires that ... [the court] assume that Congress said what it meant and meant what it 
said." Pettis ex reI. United States v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 577 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 
1978). See also 2A J.G. SUTHERLAND, supra note 123, § 46.01, at 74. 
142. "Allowance must sometimes be made for human error and inadvertence in 
drafting legislation." United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 684 F.2d 1174, 1186 (6th Cir. 
1982), aff'd, 464 U.S. 165 (1984) (citing Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 
844,871-72 (D.C. Cir. 1979». "Generally, a statute should be interpreted to give effect to 
every provision. Nevertheless, a provision which is the result of obvious mistake should 
not be given effect, particularly when it 'overrides common sense and evident statutory 
purpose.''' United States v. Babcock, 530 F.2d 1051, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (quoting 
United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25 (1948». 
143. "Ordinarily, the use of different language creates an inference that Congress 
meant different things. However, when the statutory purpose and legislative history estab­
lish that no difference was in fact intended, the inference is negated." United States v. 
Stauffer Chern. Co., 684 F.2d 1174, 1186 (6th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 464 U.S. 165 (l984)(citing 
Moore v. Harris, 623 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980». 
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purpose, courts can and should explore the legislative history in order 
to resolve the ambiguity.t44 Legislative history provides valuable in­
sight into influential conditions and circumstances surrounding legis­
lative acts.14S 
As previously discussed, the legislative history of Title IV of the 
Black Lung Benefits Reform Act provides arguments for both a re­
strictive and a general interpretation of "criteria."146 The more defen­
sible reading of that history, however, is that Congress intended a 
narrow definition. The legislative history supporting this restrictive 
reading is more numerous and persuasive. 147 It includes supportive 
comments made by committee members during debate,148 acquiesence 
to the restrictive use of "criteria" by the members of the conference 
committee and staff responsible for drafting the statute,149 and incor­
poration of the narrow view in written reports accompanying the legis­
lation. 1so The only contrary legislative history offered by the Halon 
court is language used during Boor debate.t s1 However, reliance on 
144. Legislative history often is afforded great influence in determining legislative 
intent. If a court derives a meaning from the legislative history that is contrary to the 
"plain meaning," the Supreme Court has declared that "even the most basic general princi­
ples of statutory construction must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent." 
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 
(1974) (citing Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940». See also 2A J.G. 
SUTHERLAND, supra note 123, § 48.01, at 278; Note, supra note 130, at 514. 
145. "Although an examination ofthe motives and intentions of those who enacted a 
measure is no substitute for a reading of its plain language, such an inquiry can provide 
useful context for understanding the real meaning and import of legislation." Rollins 
Envtl. Servs. (FS), Inc. v. Parish of St. James, 775 F.2d 627, 635 (5th Cir. 1985); 
The sole object of construction is to determine the legislative intent. Such intent 
must be found primarily in the language of the statute itself; but when the lan­
guage is ambiguous or the meaning is doubtful, the court should consider the 
purpose, the subject matter and the condition of affairs which led to its enact­
ment, and so construe it as to effectuate and not destroy the spirit and force of the 
lay.' and not to render it absurd. 
Premachandra v. Mitts, 727 F.2d 717, 727 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 753 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 
1985) (quoting Lambur v. Yates, 148 F.2d 137, 139 (8th Cir. 1945». See also 2A J.G. 
SUTHERLAND, supra note 123, § 48.02, at 283. 
146. See supra text accompanying notes 98-103. 
147. Legislative history, like any historical data, can be analyzed both generally and 
specifically. 2A J.G. SUTHERLAND, supra note 123, § 48.02, at 284. A "general" analysis 
"leads to an arbitrary quantitative method of evaluation where the winning conclusion is 
that one supported by the greatest number of facts." Id. A "specific" analysis provides 
. "qualitative judgments with detailed historical perspective." 	 Id. Using either analytical 
approach, both the opinion of the Strike court and the concurring and dissenting opinion of 
Judge Weis in Halon prove superior to the Halon majority decision. 
148. See supra text accompanying notes 92 and 93. 
149. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. 
150. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
151. See supra note 97. 
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any language from floor debate must be tempered by the lack of accu­
racy in the choice of words during debate. ls2 Explanatory comments 
by committee members and the bill's sponsors commonly are given 
greater weight than floor debate, because these legislators are generally 
more familiar with the legislation. ls3 In consideration of the forego­
ing, the legislative history of the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act 
weighs heavily against the broad interpretation of "criteria" advanced 
by the Halon court.IS4 
C. Scope of Review 
The analysis thus far has focused on traditional judicial interpre­
tation of a statute. The actual cases, however, present an additional 
concern: determining the appropriate scope of judicial review of an 
administrative agency's decisions. Although neither the Halon nor the 
Strike court expressly addressed this issue, both necessarily made a 
determination about the appropriate scope of review of the Secretary 
of Labor's interpretation of the statutory term "criteria." 
In reviewing agency decisions, the judiciary's role is to ensure 
152. 2A J.G. SUTHERLAND, supra note 123, § 48.13, at 329 ("As further reason for 
discounting the value of statements made in floor debate, it has been noted 'in the course of 
oral argument on the ... floor, the choice of words ... is not always accurate or ex­
act.' ")(quoting In re Carlson, 292 F. Supp. 778, 783 (C.D. Cal. 1968» aff'd, 423 F.2d 714 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970). "[C]omments ... made during the ... floor 
debates ... are not entitled to the same respect as carefully prepared committee reports." 
Vermont V. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. 606, 611 (0. Vt. 1974). 
153. See 2A J.G. SUTHERLAND, supra note 123, § 48.14, at 334. "Remarks ... 
made in the course of legislative debate or hearings other than by persons responsible for 
the preparation or the drafting of a bill are entitled to little weight." Ernst & Ernst V. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 204 n.24 (1976), reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976). 
154. The Halon court, in an attempt to diminish the significance of the legislative 
history, stated that the history was "at best, equivocal," Halon, 713 F.2d at 24, and prof­
fered its own policy arguments supporting a broad reading of "criteria." See supra notes 
98-100 and accompanying text. 
While statutes "enacted to relieve personal disadvantage, hardship, and suffering are 
generally aCcorded generous judicial acceptance and liberal construction," 2A J.G. SUTH­
ERLAND, supra note 123, § 58.04, at 716, the court is not at liberty to ignore the legislative 
intent and substitute its own policy goals. "No rule of statutory construction is more read­
ily applied by the courts than that public statutes dealing with the welfare of the whole 
people are to have a liberal construction." Hall V. Union" Light, Heat & Power Co., 53 F. 
Supp. 817, 818-19 (0. Ky. 1944). Allowing a court to substitute its own policy for the 
legislature'S is to invest the court with lawmaking power. The judiciary has no authority to 
assume such a power. "A court cannot second-guess and substitute iis judgment for that of 
the legislature or insert what it deems has been omitted." Harmon V. Phillips Petroleum 
Co., 555 F. Supp. 447, 452 (0. Mont. 1982). "[I]t is the duty of the court to interpret the 
statute as it is and not to read into it something that is not there." Northern Pac. Ry. Co. 
V. Reynolds, 68 F. Supp. 492, 499 (0. Minn. 1946), aff'd, 168 F.2d 934 (1948), cert. denied, 
335 U.S. 828 (1948). 
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that the agency has acted within the prescribed limits defined by Con­
gress in the enabling act.1SS The statute reflects the public policy that 
Congress seeks to effectuate through agency activity.IS6 A court, 
armed with this policy, evaluates whether the agency is functioning in 
accordance with its directive. ls7 However, a court encounters great 
difficulty in determining compliance with congressional policy when 
Congress has failed to reflect, or has ambiguously reflected, a policy 
decision in the statutory language. ISS 
The proper scope of judicial review traditionally is governed by 
the affixation of artificial labels to the agency decision.ls9 The court 
predominantly characterizes a decision as on~ of two types: a finding 
of fact or a conclusion of law. 160 Each characterization commands a 
155. "Reviewing courts are not obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirm­
ance of administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or 
that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute." NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 
278, 291 (1965), cited in-Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign 
Comm'n, 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981). See also SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978); Federal 
Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1973); Volkswagenwerk v. 
Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968). 
''The choice of goals and objectives is a policy choice of the legislature, and the court's 
function is to ascertain the legislature'S choice and to apply it, including the assurance of 
faithful application by agencies . . . .:' National Ass'n of Greeting Card Publishers v. 
United States Postal Serv., 607 F.2d 392, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 444 U.S. 1025 
(1980). See also R. PIERCE, JR., S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
PROCESS § 5.1.4, at 124, § 7.1, at 350 (1985) [hereinafter R. PIERCE, JR.]. "When Con­
gress grants an agency power to act in an area, it accOmpanies that grant of power with 
statutory limits on the type of action the agency can take and the factual circumstances in 
which it is empowered to act." Id. § 7.1, at .350. 
156. R. PIERCE, JR., supra note 155, § 7.1, at 350. But see Diver, Statutory Interpre­
tation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549,553 (1985) ("Does statutory text 
have any intrinsic meaning apart from context?"). 
157. "Administrative determinations must have a basis in law and must be within 
the granted authority." Social Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946). "An agency 
action is ultra vires when the agency has acted beyond the scope of its defined authority." 
Kenda Rubber Indus. Co. v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 354, 356 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). 
By reviewing an agency's actions, a court ensures that those actions harmonize with the 
"legislative policy decisions reflected in [the] statute[] ... delegat[ing] power to [the] 
agenc[y]." R. PIERCE, JR., supra note 155, § 7.1, at 350. 
158. R. PIERCE, JR., supra note 155, § 7.1, at 352. 
159. "[T]he focus has been on fitting the questions presented on review into hoary 
categories ...." W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, P. STRAUSS, T. RAKOFF & R. SCHOTLAND, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES AND CoMMENTS 352 (8th ed. 1987) [hereinafter W. 
GELLHORN]. 
160. W. GELLHORN, supra note 159, at 352. Scholars employ the labels "questions 
of fact" and "questions of law" to characterize the type of agency decision. . 
No two terms oflegal science have rendered better service than "law" and "fact." 
They are basic assumptions; irreducible minimums and the most comprehensive 
maximums at the same instant. They readily accommodate themselves to any 
meaning we desire to give them. In them and their kind a science of law finds its 
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different standard of review. 
An agency decision categorized by a reviewing court as a finding 
of fact is sub-categorized for purposes of determining the appropriate 
standard of review. A finding of fact, made by an agency using formal 
procedures,161 is subject to judicial review under the substantial evi­
dence test. 162 Agency findings arrived at through informal proce­
dures l63 are subject to review under the arbitrary and capricious 
test. l64 Some argue that, as applied to findings of fact, the "substantial 
evidence" test and the "arbitrary and capricious" test are functionally 
indistinguishable. 16s 
An agency decision categorized by a reviewing court as a conclu­
sion of law also is subject to varying degrees of review. Some conclu­
strength and durability. They are the creations of centuries. What judge has not 
found refuge in them? The man who could succeed in defining them would be a 
public enemy. 
Id. at 352-53 (quoting L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 270-71 (1930». 
161. "Formal rulemaking" is the statutory requirement that an agency rule be made 
"on the record" through an agency hearing open to the public. Administrative Procedure 
Act §§ 4(b), 7 & 8, 5 U.S.c. §§ 553(c), 556 & 557 (1982). "Formal adjudication" is the 
statutory requirement that an agency judgment be made subsequent to a trial-type hearing. 
Administrative Procedure Act § 5, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1982). 
162. "Review under the substantial-evidence test is authorized only when the agency 
action is taken pursuant to a rulemaking provision of the Administrative Procedure Act 
itself, 5 U.S.C § 553 or when the agency action is based on a public adjudicatory hearing." 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971) (citation omit­
ted). See Administrative Procedure Act § 100e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982). Under the 
substantial evidence test, a court must sustain an agency's finding of fact as long as there is 
substantial evidence, Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938), when 
the record is considered as a whole. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487­
88 (1951). See also R. PIERCE, JR., supra note 155, §§ 7.3 & 7.3.1, at 357. 
163. "Informal rulemaking" is the statutory requirement that the agency merely 
publish proposed rules and receive comments from interested parties before publishing final 
regulations and a "concise general statement of their basis and purpose." Administrative 
Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982). "Informal adjudication" is the "catchall cate­
gory covering a multitude of 'final' agency decisions which do not fit anywhere else and 
which have no common theme or pattern." Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal 
Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38,40 n.14 (1975). 
164. "[T]he court must consider whether the [agency] decision was based on a con­
sideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." 
Volpe, 401 U.S. at 416. See also Administrative Procedure Act § 100e), 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(A) (1982); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 182 (abr. 
ed. 1965). The arbitrary and capricious test requires the court to set aside an agency action 
determined to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord­
ance with law." Administrative Procedure Act § 100e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). The 
court should defer to an agency decision made under express delegation of authority unless 
the decision is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). See also 
R. PIERCE, JR., supra note 155, § 7.3.2, at 360. 
165. R. PIERCE, JR., supra note 155, § 7.3.3, at 363. 
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sions of law are reviewed under the rarely-employed de novo 
standard. l66 Other conclusions of law are reviewed under the rational 
basis standard. 167 
Despite the seeming simplicity of this categorization scheme, the 
agency decision often inextricably combines findings of fact and con­
clusions of law.168 In such situations, courts have solved the dilemma 
by classifying these "mixed questions"169 as questions of fact when 
they desire limited review of the agency decision and as questions of 
law when they desire expansive review.17° In using this approach, 
166. In "narrow circumstances the reviewing court is to engage in a de novo review 
of the action and set it aside if it was 'unwarranted by the facts.''' Volpe, 401 U.S. at 414. 
Pursuant to Administrative Procedure Act § 100e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F), de novo review is 
authorized only when the agency action is adjudicatory in nature and the factfinding proce­
dures are inadequate, and when "issues that were not before the agency are raised in a 
proceeding to enforce nonadjudicatory agency action." Volpe, 401 U.S. at 415. See also R. 
PIERCE, JR., supra note ISS, § 7.4, at 370. 
Under de novo review, the court does not defer to the agency conclusion; rather, it 
substitutes its independent judgment. Id. § 7.4.1, at 370. See. e.g., Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 96-108 (1983) (the Court disregarded the 
FLRA's reading of a statute as allowing order of payment of travel expenses and per diem 
in addition to salary to a union employee appointed to negotiate a dispute, holding that the 
statute only permitted payment of salary); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 110-23 (1978) (the 
Court substituted its judgment after the SEC interpreted a statutory provision allowing a 
10000y suspension of stock trading for suspected stock manipulation to empower the 
agency to issue consecutive suspensions (totalling over one year) as long as it was in the 
public interest). 
167. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944); Gray v. Pow­
ell, 314 U.S. 402, 412 (1941). See also R. PIERCE, JR., supra note ISS, § 7.4.2, at 372. 
Under the rational basis standard, the scope of review is limited and the court defers to an 
agency's procedure, finding, and conclusion if there is a "rational basis" for the decision. 
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973); Hearst, 322 U.S. at 131 (the Court upheld the NLRB's 
interpretation of the broad term "employee" to include newspaper vendors, stating that 
"the Board'~ determination ... is to be accepted if it has warrant in the record and a 
reasonable basis in the law."). 
Judicial deference is founded on three grounds: 1) agencies often have superior knowl­
edge and resources in the particular area; 2) the constitutional role of courts does not per­
mit substitution ofjudicial policy for regulatory policy; and 3) Congress often demonstrates 
its intent, explicitly or implicitly, that agencies have a measure of discretion in decision­
making. R. PIERCE, JR., supra note ISS, § 5.1.4, at 124-26, § 7.1, at 351-52. When Con­
gress chooses to delegate decisionmaking authority to an agency instead of making the 
decision itself, the agency seemingly has unbridled discretion. In order to minimize the 
potential for abuse, reviewing courts seek rationality and consistency in agency decisions. 
Id. § 7.1, at 353. 
168. "[T]he distinction between 'law' and 'fact,' on which the scope of review is 
based, is not nearly so well defined as is often supposed." B. SCHWARTZ, .AN INTRODUC­
TION TO AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 202 (1962). 
169. 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 30.01, at 189 (1958). 
170. "The reviewing Court itself has the final word upon whether the particular find­
ing is one of 'law' or 'fact,' and, in deciding that question it, in effect, determines whether 
the review of that finding is to be a broad or narrow one." B. ScHWARTZ, supra note 168, 
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courts abandon the "analytical" or literal meaning of the characteriz­
ing terms in favor of a "practical" meaning. 17l Alternatively, some 
courts faced with the "mixed question" scenario avoid the law-fact 
distinction entirely by utilizing the rational basis test.172 With this 
method, the courts, believing substitution of judgment to be inappro­
priate, recite that the agency decision "must be upheld if it has war­
rant in the record and rational basis in law."173 
Regardless of whether a court elects the law-fact distinction or 
the rational basis test to determine the scope of review, the fact re­
mains that the court's choice between substituting judgment or defer­
ring to the agency is highly discretionary.174 However, three major 
• 
at 203. See also 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 169, § 30.01, at 190 (Supreme Court classifies 
mixed questions solely as questions of "fact" when it desires to limit review). Factors that 
guide a court in its determination of whether to review broadly or narrowly are examined 
subsequently in this note. See infra notes 175-84 and accompanying text. . 
171. For a thorough discussion of the "analytical" and "practical" approaches to the 
law-fact distinction, see 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 169, § 30.02, at 192-98. Confusion sur­
rounding the "analytical" approach to the law-fact distinction has caused commentators to 
reject it as a viable method. G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSION 97-98 
(1924) ("[T]he Supreme Court ... has created ... a category of 'administrative questions,' 
upon which it will refuse to substitute its judgment. . . . These cases do not rest upon any 
supposed distinction between questions of fact or law; generally they are neither, but 
merely judgments of a practical character."). See also E. PATTERSON, THE INSURANCE 
COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES 491 (1927) ("The classical analysis ofadministra­
tive problems into 'questions of law' and 'questions of fact' is too uncertain and confusing 
to be of much value. "); Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways ofLaw and Fact, 
57 HARV. L. REV. 753, 812 (1944) (footnotes omitted) ("What is law to one Justice is fact 
to another, and perhaps vice versa when the next case comes along .... Congenial assump­
tions are frequently rushed in as synthetic substitutes for analysis, and 'fact' and 'law' fly 
thick and fast. Verbal ingenuity easily fits the desired result. "). 
172. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) ("[W)here the 
question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which 
the agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's func­
tion is limited. . .. The [agency's decision] is to be accepted if it has 'warrant in the record' 
and a reasonable basis in law."); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411 (1941) ("In a matter left 
specifically by Congress to the determination of an administrative body ... the function of 
review placed upon the courts ... is fully performed when they determine that there has 
been a fair hearing ... and an application of the statute in a just and reasoned manner."); 
Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1939) (quoting Mississippi 
Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1934» ("So long as there is 
warrant in the record for the judgment of the expert body it must stand. . .. 'The judicial 
function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions ap­
proved by the administrative body.' "). See also 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 169, § 30.01, at 
192, § 30.05, at 214. 
173. 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 169, § 30.05, at 214. 
174. 	 Id., § 30.14, at 269. 
Much the most troublesome problem about scope of review is to discover 
what it is that guides the courts in choosing between the reasonableness test and 
the rightness test, that is, between the 'rational basis' test and substitution ofjudg­
ment, in reviewing the application of legal concepts to the facts of a case. 
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factors guide a court in setting the scope of review of an administrative 
agency decision: 1) "the comparative qualification of court and 
agency to decide the particular issue;"17S 2) "the extent to which the 
legislative body has committed particular problems to administrative 
or to judicial determination;"176 and 3) "the tendency ofthe courts to 
substitute judgment on broad generalizations, especially important 
ones, and to avoid such substitution of judgment on narrow or unique 
applications of law."177 
Id., § 30.01, at 189. 
[C]ourts sometimes substitute judgment and sometimes use the rational basis test 
on problems of applying legal concepts to established facts, and ... which of the 
two courses a court will follow in a particular case is usually a matter of judicial 
discretion and is not governed by formula or by systematic theory. 
Id., § 30.09, at 240. 
175. Id., § 30.14, at 269. "If the issue falls outside the area generally entrusted to the 
agency, and is one in which the courts have a special competence, i.e., the common law or 
the constitutional law, there is little reason for the judiciary to defer to an administrative 
interpretation." Hi-Craft Clothing Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 910, 914-15 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(citing Piper v. Chris Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1,41 n.27 (1977». See also Institute for Scien­
tific Information, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 555 F.2d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 1977). 
176. 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 169, § 30.14, at 270. "In areas where Congress has 
delegated authority to an administrative body to determine arcane areas of regulatory law, 
the courts should defer to the will of Congress." Delaware and Hudson Ry. v. Consoli­
dated Rail Corp., 533 F. Supp. 692, 698 (N.D. N.Y. 1981). "[W]here an agency's decision 
rests in large part on technical and scientific data and is in an area in which discretion has 
been delegated to it by Congress, such judgments should be respected." American Meat 
Inst. v. Bergland, 459 F. Supp. 1308, 1316 (D.D.C. 1978). 
177. 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 169, § 30.14, at 270. "[L]egal issues presented-that is, 
the identification of governing legal standards ... are ... for the courts to resolve ...." 
FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986). "[W]hen the question is one 
of law and does not involve the expertise of an agency, [the court is] not bound by that 
agency's decision." Charter Limousine, Inc. v. Dade County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 678 
F.2d 586, 588 (5th Cir. 1982). 
In addition to the three main influencing factors, there exist several supporting factors. 
For example, the soundness, thoroughness, and consistency evident in the agency's consid­
eration, Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); and the longevity of the inter­
pretation, and congressional acquiescence through reenactment of the same language while 
aware ofthe interpretation, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267,275 (1974); Massa­
chusetts Trustees of E. Gas & Fuel Assoc. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235, 241 (1964); 
Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933) may be impor­
tant considerations. Still more support favoring judicial deference is found in policy argu­
ments suggesting that the agency is better situated to know what Congress intended. These 
arguments are: 1) where Congress authorized the agency to issue regulations, it is foresee­
able that the issuance of such regulations will require interpretation by the administrative 
agency of its authority; 2) where Congress involved the agency in the enactment of the 
enabling statute, the agency gains an inside perspective as to the intent of the legislature; 
and 3) "congressional reliance on the agency's expertise in the area" is enough to support 
deference to the agency's interpretation of the statute. Hetzel, Instilling Legislative Inter­
pretation Skills in the Classroom and the Counroom, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 663, 680-81 
(1987). 
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The comparative qualification of the court or agency is perhaps 
the most influential of the three factors bearing on the court's discre­
tion in establishing scope of review.178 in assessing the comparative 
qualification, "the courts are generally the experts, as compared with 
agencies, on many types of issues, and this fact alone is frequently a 
sufficient reason for substitution of judicial. for administrative judg­
ment on problems of applying legal concepts to established facts."179 
Statutory interpretation, absent technical and non-legal subject mat­
ter, is manifestly within the province of the jUdiciary. ISO 
The extent to which the legislative body has delegated the partic- . 
ular issue to the administrative agency. is another factor influencing 
the scope of review. For example, where the agency is acting legisla­
tively within congressionally delegated authority, the Supreme Court 
consistently has declared that judicial judgment should not be substi­
tuted for the agency rule. lSI Absent congressional delegation of au­
178. 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 169, § 30.09, at 240-41, § 30.14, at 269. 
179. Id., § 30.09, at 241. "[C]ourts ... are comparatively the experts in ... constitu­
tionallaw, common law, ethics, overall philosophy of law and government, judge-made law 
developed through statutory interpretation, most analysis of legislative history, and 
problems transcending the particular field of the agency." Id. 
180. "Undoubtedly questions of statutory interpretation, especially when arising in 
the first instance in judicial proceedings, are for the courts to resolve, giving appropriate 
weight to the judgment of those whose special duty is to administer the questioned statute." 
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. Ill, 130-31 (1944) (citation omitted). See 
also Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922); ("When the 
words of a written instrument are used in their ordinary meaning, their construction 
presents a question solely oflaw.") 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 169, § 30.09, at 242. ("[C]ourts 
are the specialists, whether analysis of legislative history is called for, or whether the main 
process is one of finding the meaning of the words. ")(footnote omitted). 
181. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (943). Describing its role, the Court 
stated: 
Our duty is at an end when we find that the action of the ... [agency] was based 
upon findings supported by evidence, and was made pursuant to authority 
granted by Congress. It is not for us to say that the 'public interest' will be fur­
thered or retarded by the [agency regulation]. 
Id. at 224. In American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936), 
the Court professed: 
This court is not at liberty to substitute its own discretion for that of administra­
tive officers who have kept within the bounds of their administrative powers. To 
show that these have been exceeded in the field of action here involved, it is not 
enough that the ... [agency action] shall appear to be unwise or burdensome or 
inferior to another. Error or unwisdom is not equivalent to abuse. What has 
been ordered must appear to be "so entirely at odds with fundamental principles 
of ... [the delegated task]" as to be the expression of a whim rather than an 
exercise of judgment. 
Id. at 236-37 (citation omitted). The obvious reason for the judicial restraint in reviewing 
legislative rules is that Congress delegated the power to legislate to the agency and not to 
the court. 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 169, § 30.10, at 249. 
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thority, agency regulations are not legislation; but are merely 
interpretative rules subject to broad review. ls2 
Finally, the last influential factor in determining scope of review 
is whether the issue before the agency calls for proclamation of a gen­
eral proposition or procedure, or merely requires the application of 
such a proposition or procedure to unique facts. IS3 When the issue 
involves a general statement of what the law is, as opposed to how it is 
applied, the court is likely to substitute judgment. 184 
In a 1984 decision, the Supreme Court attempted to dispel linger­
ing confusion surrounding the scope of review of an administrative 
agency determination of a "mixed question" by solidifying the "rea­
sonableness" and "rightness" test. The standard of judicial deference 
was set forth clearly and concisely in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. ISS Under a two-pronged test devel­
oped by the Supreme Court in Chevron, a reviewing court must first 
182. "The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thor­
oughness evident in [the agency's] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consis­
tency with earlier and later pronouncements; and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control." Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
See also Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694,702 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Although an agency 
empowered to enact legislative rules may choose to issue non-legislative statements, an 
agency without legislative rulemaking authority may issue only non-binding statements. 
Unlike legislative rules, non-binding agency statements carry no more weight on judicial 
review than their inherent persuasiveness commands.") (footnote omitted); 4 K. DAVIS, 
supra note 169, § 30.10, at 249. 
183. 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 169, § 30.11, at 253. 
184. For example, in Hearst, the NLRB, in administering the National Labor Rela­
tions Act, determined that newsboys were "employees" for purposes of the statute. The 
respondent argued that the definition of "employee" must take into account common law 
standards, and that common law usage would not allow the characterization of newsboys 
as "employees." The Supreme Court substituted judgment, proclaiming the general propo­
sition that the definition of a statutory term is not restricted by common law, but rather it 
takes its definition "from the history, terms and purposes of the legislation." NLRB v. 
Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. Ill, 124 (1944). 
185. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Congress, in passing the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1977, required states not in conformity with the national air quality standard established by 
earlier legislation to establish a program regulating "new or modified major stationary 
sources" of pollution. Id. at 839-40. Neither the amendment nor the legislative history 
provided insight into Congress' envisioned definition of "stationary source." Id. at 841. 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), charged with administering the Act, 
promulgated a regulation that allowed a state to choose a plant-wide definition of "station­
ary source," thereby allowing the installation or modification of a single piece of equip­
ment, provided that the alteration would not add to the total emission from the plant. Id. 
at 840. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. challenged the agency regulation and the 
Court of Appeals set it aside, finding it "inappropriate" because the purpose of the Act was 
to improve, not merely to maintain, the air quality. Id. at 840-41. In reversing the deci­
sion, the Supreme Court elaborated a two-part inquiry for reviewing an agency's interpreta­
tion of a statute. Id. at 842-43. 
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determine "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise ques­
tion at issue."186 If the court, using traditional methods of statutory 
construction, determines that the intent of Congress is clear, then the 
court must effectuate that intent, rejecting contrary agency interpreta­
tions. 187 Alternatively, if the court finds the congressional intent am­
biguous, the second prong of the test is applied, and the court need 
only determine whether the agency's interpretation is a permissible 
construction. 188 The court must defer to the agency interpretation if 
the court deems it a permissible construction. Intrinsic to this second 
prong of the test is the notion that congressional silence or ambiguity 
is an implicit delegation of authority to the agency to fill the gaps in 
the statute. 189 The remainder of this note examines the scope of re­
view established in Halon and Strike in light of the Chevron test and 
the underlying influential factors. 
Both the Halon and Strike courts faced the specific problem of 
how much deference to give to the Secretary of Labor's interpretation 
of "criteria" in section 902(f)(2). While neither court deferred to the 
agency, they reached opposite conclusions. Regardless of the differ­
ence in outcome, both decisions were in accord with conventional 
thinking in administrative law. 
In Halon and Strike, the determination of scope of review was 
obvious. By its terms, the statute did not expressly delegate authority 
to make policy decisions. In fact, the statute left no policy gaps to fill. 
Congress controlled the contraction of the standards by authorizing 
186. Id. at 842. 
187. Id. at 842-43. See, e.g., FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 
U.S. 27, 32 (1981) (the Court reviewed and upheld a Federal Election Commission's inter­
pretation of a provision in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971). This first prong of 
the Chevron test contemplates the most influential of the three aforementioned factors bear­
ing on the court's discretion in establishing scope of review. Requiring the court to deter­
mine whether Congress has expressed its intent with regard to the issue recognizes the 
comparative expertise of the court over the agency in matters of statutory interpretation. 
See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text. 
188. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. To be a permissible construction, a construction need 
not be the only possible one, nor the construction that the court would adopt had the issue 
been presented to the court originally. Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. at 39. 
189. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. See also Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 87, 250 (1984). For example, in Chevron, Congress' silence concerning the in­
tended meaning of "stationary source" should be viewed as an authorization for the EPA 
to establish a definition that reflects a reasonable policy choice. The second prong of the 
test clearly considers the second factor as influencing the court's discretion in establishing 
scope of review. Requiring the court to consider the reasonableness of the agency's inter­
pretation subsequent to concluding that Congress has not spoken to the issue recognizes the 
implicit delegation of authority by Congress to the agency to fill in the gaps. See supra 
notes 181-82 and· accompanying text. 
391 1988] BLACK LUNG BENEFITS ACT OF 1977 
the promulgation of standards that would "not be more restrictive 
than the criteria [of the interim stan(jards established by the Secretary 
of HEW]."190 Congress governed the expansion of the s~andards by 
requiring that they "accurately reflect total disability."191 The statu­
tory instruction directs performance of a task within explicit limita­
tions. The significance of the limitations is two-fold. First, they 
indicate that Congress did, in fact, have an intent with respect to the 
promulgation of standards. Second, by indicating the existence of con­
gressional intent, the limitations charged the court with the duty to 
ensure that the Secretary of Labor act within the authority granted. 
In carrying out this duty, the court, and not the agency, determines 
any interpretation of congressional intent. 
The Halon court determined that congressional intent was clearly 
expressed in the plain meaning of the statute, and did not defer to the 
Secretary of Labor's interpretation of section 902(f)(2).192 The court 
concluded that Congress intended the term "criteria" to encompass 
medical criteria as well as the elements of the interim presumption, 
and, therefore, rejected the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of "cri­
teria." Because congressional intent was clear, the Halon court appar­
ently concluded that it was free to impose the "correct" interpretation 
of the statute without regard to the agency's interpretation. 
The Strike court, likewise, did not defer to the Secretary of La­
bor's interpretation. 193 Unlike the Halon court, however, the Strike 
court concluded that the congressional intent was expressed ambigu­
ously in the language of the statute. 194 The court then ascertained 
congressional intent from the legislative history.19S The court deter­
mined that the Secretary of Labor's construction was in accordance 
with Congress' intended meaning, and affirmed the agency's 
interpretation. 196 
If the Secretary of Labor interpreted "criteria" to include medical 
criteria as well as the elements ofthe interim presumption, the Strike 
court would not and should not have supported this interpretation. 
Deference to an administrative agency's interpretation is appropriate 
only when neither the plain meaning of the statute nor the legislative 
190. 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(2) (1982) (emphasis added). 
191. 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(1)(D) (1982). 
192. Halon v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 713 F.2d 21, 
24-25 (3d Cir. 1983). 
193. Strike v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 817 F.2d 395, 
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history yields the congressional intent as to the issue in question. The 
legislative history of the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977 indi­
cates that Congress intended the term "criteria" in section 902(f)(2) to 
mean "medical criteria."197 The court in Strike therefore would have 
and should have applied the interpretation that it developed without 
regard to the agency interpretation. 
Although employment of this scope of review analysis does not 
alter the results reached by the Strike and Halon courts, it nevertheless 
is interesting. It illuminates the difficulty that the courts have had in 
dealing with this issue, and the difficulty that the United States 
Supreme Court will face in Director, Office of Workers' Compensation 
Programs v. Broyles. 198 
CONCLUSION 
The text199 and legislative history2°O of Title IV of the Federal 
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act indicate that the term "criteria" in 
section 902(f)(2) includes only "medical criteria," and not interim ad­
judicatory and. evidentiary standards. Because the congressional in­
tent of section 902(f)(2), as revealed by the text and legislative history, 
is not violated by the enactment of the Part C standards without the 
evidentiary provisions contained in the HEW interim standards, the 
Strike court properly affirmed the Secretary of Labor's interpretation. 
In deciding Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. 
Broyles,201 the Supreme Court should adopt the "statute as a whole" 
construction of section 902(f)(2) suggested by the concurring and dis­
senting opinion of Judge Weis in Halon and endorsed by the court in 
Strike. 
Richard A. Vassallo 
197. Id. For a discussion of the legislative history. see supra notes 144-54 and ac­
companying text. 
198. 824 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1987). cert. granted. 108 S. Ct. 1288 (1988). 
199. See supra notes 122-43 and accompanying text. 
200. See ~upra notes 144-54 and accompanying text. 
201. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. 
